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The existing international laws of war, known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), 
apply to all operational theatres, including cyberspace. International law distinguishes 
between two forms of aggression, both of which are impermissible under LOAC: the 
use of force, and armed attack. Absent an authorisation of force by the UN Security 
Council, only states under armed attack are legally allowed to deploy military force 
against another state.  
Cyberspace is functionally distinct from land, air, sea and space. This distinction has 
a number of sources. First, cyberspace is the only man-made domain of warfare: the 
character of the domain space has been defined, and will continue to be defined, solely 
by human activity. Second, cyberspace is an intrinsically informational domain: it is used 
to create, organise, transfer, manipulate, assimilate and disseminate data. Cyberspace, 
in other words, consists of information and has an intrinsic informational raison d’être. 
It is a categorical mistake to treat the physical computing assets that sustain cyberspace 
as the domain of cyberspace itself.
This gives rise to confusions surrounding the role and applicability of the Law of Armed 
Conflict in cyberspace: 
1. The gap between use of force and armed attack is already a contentious one, 
creating disputes about what level and kind of violence meets the ‘armed 
attack’ threshold. Cyberspace’s unique properties dilute the meaning of 
these terms further: they enable non-violent electronic incursions – such as 
data theft, or systems sabotage – on a scale so vast that states’ core security 
interests can be threatened, without any of the immediate kinetic damage 
traditional attacks produce. 
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2. Absent clear definitions of what constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace, 
states are likely to turn away from treaty-based conflict regulation and instead 
rely on more nebulous formulations based on national security instincts at best, 
and downright case-by-case evaluations at worst. This increases the chances of 
errors and miscalculations by state actors in cyberspace. 
3. Conceptual confusions surrounding legal terms, in addition to low barriers to 
entry and attribution difficulties, give grounds to expect a marked increase in 
low-intensity cyber hostilities, at great cost to states and businesses, and with 
the potential to undermine trust in the Internet as a whole.
 
In response to these problems, this report calls on the international community of states to 
negotiate a body of law to regulate armed conflict in cyberspace. Internationally agreed-
upon definitions on cyber use of force, cyber attack, and cyber espionage will provide 
the clarity needed to anchor states’ expectations of military behaviour in cyberspace. 
Otherwise, states’ cyber operations will increasingly push boundaries of the acceptable 
in order to tease out the limits of what can be gotten away with: states will resort to 
proxy combatants, digital camouflage and other acts of perfidy in order to circumvent 
constraints on armed conflict that were developed in a non-digital era. 
Cyber hostilities are not the only source of security threats on the Internet: cyber crime is 
an equally destabilising force. Because attribution is difficult in a digital context, identifying 
and holding accountable actors in cyberspace is challenging. The most difficult hurdle, 
however, is not technical: the central problem is insufficient law enforcement cooperation 
between states. An intergovernmental body that institutionalises such collaboration will 
strengthen states’ efforts to tackle the scourge of Internet crime. Cyber criminals hide 
behind the international legal barriers erected by sovereignty which their arena of crime – 
the Internet – does not heed. Placing a positive duty on states to help each other prosecute 
cyber crime has the added benefit of reducing the incentive for states to outsource illegal 
cyber war operations to ‘cyber militias’ that operate at arm’s length: non-cooperation by 
a government during the prosecution of cyber perpetrators can be taken as evidence for 
joint culpability. 
Cyberspace is a shared military and civilian domain. If the military dimension gradually 
evolves into a zone of perpetual low-intensity combat, the integrity of civilian cyberspace 
will steadily erode away. This report makes two recommendations to avert that scenario:
1. The community of states needs commonly agreed-upon legal standards to 
define what constitutes an illegal armed attack in cyberspace.
2. The community of states needs to establish an obligation for mutual assistance 
in cross-border cyber crime investigations. 
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These two steps, if implemented, ought to introduce a degree of order and certainty to 
cyberspace and, as a corollary, enable the serious prosecution of cyber criminals who 
currently take advantage of limited intergovernmental legal cooperation in cyberspace. 
 
inTernaTional law consTrains how sTaTes wage war 
There exists a relatively comprehensive framework of norms that governs both the 
process of going to war and conduct in war. States generally adhere by these rules. 
Certain categories of weapons are banned outright and others are strictly controlled; 
the use of force by one state against another is outlawed unless it is for self-defence; 
rules differentiate between legal and illegal operations and strategies in war. 
New technologies put a strain on these legal understandings as states establish the 
compatibility of a novel weapon with existing laws of war. Air power provides a good 
example of this. As with the Internet, airplanes were first used for intelligence gathering 
before the military potential – inflicting massive damage to enemy territory through 
aerial bombardments – was recognised, including the threats it posed to civilians. The 
day the Second World War broke out in Europe, Franklin D. Roosevelt cabled all warring 
parties asking for a public pledge that their air forces would not intentionally target 
civilian populations. England, Germany, France and Poland all agreed, and, as one 
opponent of international cyber law states, ‘they tried to honour their pledges’.1 This 
informal agreement lasted almost a full year, despite it not being codified in treaty law. 
It collapsed because of the ruthlessness of German military strategy: after the Luftwaffe 
destroyed the entire old city of Rotterdam in May 1940, Britain retaliated in kind over 
the Rhineland, and the war in the skies quickly became unlimited. 
The attempt to define the permissible scope of aerial combat in the Second World War 
shows that states are willing to establish communal norms of warfare and try to follow 
them. Two powerful dynamics act against the rationale of complying with the laws of 
war: the military logic of the technology in question, and the absence of enforcement 
mechanisms. Circumscribing a technology’s military utility creates incentives for 
cheating, giving a unique strategic advantage to defector states, especially if there is 
no way to punish cheaters. Nonetheless, nations were and are willing to work out rules 
of war that benefit all parties, to sign up to them, and to try to comply. The key is to 
frame pragmatic rules that work, and to monitor compliance through a permanent 
institutional mechanism, the absence of which undermined the airpower agreement in 
the Second World War. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for example, has proved a 
successful legal instrument to curtail the spread of nuclear arms, preventing this class of 
weapons from becoming a commonplace tool in the arsenal of states.
1 Baker, Stewart A. and Charles J. Dunlap. ‘What is the Role of Laywers in Cyberwarfare?’ American Bar 
Association Journal, May 2012
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International legal norms surrounding war have meaning: most states try to abide by 
them, and they also exert significant efforts to signal to the international community that 
they do so.2 All the evidence suggests that states, by and large, observe the international 
treaties they subscribe to, a principle known as pacta sunt servanda. As American legal 
scholar Louis Henken put it in 1968, ‘almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time’.3 Henken made 
this observation at a time when international law, after the terrible events of the Second 
World War, became an increasingly influential component of the thickening web of 
international relations in a globalising age, spearheaded by political institutions such as 
the UN and technocratic multilateral organisations such as GATT. Whether coincidentally 
or not, inter-state warfare became less and less common in this era of a growing, 
solidifying international legal order.4 At best, international law facilitated this laudable 
trend, at worst it didn’t preclude it. In any event, LOAC has provided a degree of clarity 
and a global normative convergence regarding impermissible state behaviour. 
 
cyBerspace is a unique domain ThaT challenges convenTional 
undersTandings of use of force, armed aTTack and espionage
Cyberspace arises out of the Internet, the global set of interlinked computer data 
networks that are used for both physical and ideational purposes.5 The name ‘cyberspace’ 
is given to the digital data trail generated by interconnected computers. While cyberspace 
cannot be spatially located, it gives rise to ‘real’ effects. The contrast to other operational 
theatres is simple: cyberspace cannot be reduced to physical attributes only. It is partially 
a material domain, used for commercial activities (e.g. e-banking) and infrastructure 
management (e.g. industrial control systems), and partially an ideational domain – a 
platform for information exchange and communication. In 1984, William Gibson published 
Neuromancer, one of the formative works of the cyberpunk genre that anticipated many 
features of the computer age we now take for granted. Gibson metaphorically styled 
cyberspace as ‘a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions … Unthinkable 
complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations 
of data.’6 More prosaically, the Congressional Research Service defines cyberspace as 
‘non-physical terrain created by computer systems’.7 Cyberspace expresses human 
thought in data and allows it to manipulate – through computers and other humans – the 
physical world. 
2 Koh, Harold H. ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ The Yale Law Journal (1997) Vol. 106
3 Henkin, Louis. How Nations Behave. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1968
4 For the decline in inter-state war, see Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta 
Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. ‘Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.’ Journal of Peace Research 
(2002) Vol. 39
5 Michael Benedikt formally defined cyberspace as “a globally networked, computer-sustained, computer-
accessed, and computer-generated, multidimensional, artificial or ‘virtual’ reality” in Cyberspace: First Steps. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994
6 Cited in Jagoda, Patrick. ‘Speculative Security,’ in Reveron, Derek (ed.), From Cybersecurity to Cyberwar. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012
7 US Congressional Research Service. ‘Cyberwarfare.’ (RL30735; June 19, 2001) by Steven A. Hildreth. 
Benjamin Mueller 5 
This nebulous complexity is the root reason why we struggle to answer basic questions 
of military doctrine such as, ‘When does a cyber operation amount to the use of 
force?’ After all, such operations need not result in immediate physical destruction. 
This legal haze surrounding cyber operations confuses the categorisation of incidents, 
and, by extension, the determination of legitimate responses. The Agent.btz malware 
discovered by the NSA in 2008 provides a good example of the problem.8 Agent.btz, a 
spying programme, infected the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network used by the 
State and Defense departments to transmit classified material, and the Joint Worldwide 
Intelligence Communication System through which Top Secret information is sent to 
US officials across the globe. To remove Agent.Btz the military launched Operation 
Buckshot Yankee, which ended up lasting 14 months. This entailed the escalation of 
US Strategic Command’s information security threat level, since programmes used by 
battlefield commanders for intelligence and communications were implicated in the 
clean-up. Agent.btz was a purely data-related cyber incursion, but one of such a vast 
scale that it destabilised military command and control systems and threatened to cross 
the boundary between espionage mission and outright attack. An intense conceptual 
debate began among the various affected US government agencies concerning the 
nature of what they were dealing with: did the US experience a military attack, requiring 
a response in kind by the military’s offensive cyber unit at the time, Joint Functional 
Component Command? Or should the incident be treated as an act of espionage, albeit 
on an enormous scale? In the event, policy officials opted for the latter interpretation. 
Agent.btz demonstrated the difficulty of treating cyberspace like any other operational 
domain: cyber security and intelligence operations overlap. Unlike non-cyber espionage, 
cyber incursions can be mounted against other states remotely and scaled up to such 
a degree that they implicate core national security concerns. Such incidents can be 
likened to covert military operations. Interpreting international law in this novel context 
is enormously difficult.
The official policy of the United States is that the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
applies to cyberspace, since all new technologies are subject to existing laws of war.9 
Conceptually, however, there are strong reasons to suspect that cyberspace should be 
subject to a discrete body of law.
The clarity of the concepts relied on by the Law of Armed Conflict is diluted in cyberspace
The LOAC restricts the use of military force between states: Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter outlaws the use of force against the territorial integrity of another 
state, and Article 51 of the Charter entitles a targeted state to respond against an 
armed attack with its own, proportionate use of a force. US doctrine in the event of 
 
 8 For an in-depth report, see Nakashima, Ellen. “Cyber-Intruder Sparks Massive Federal Response — and 
Debate Over Dealing with Threats.” The Washington Post. 09 Dec. 2011. Web. 22 Mar. 2014.
 9 See Koh, Harold H. ‘International Law in Cyberspace.’ Harvard International Law Journal (2012) Vol. 54
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a cyber intrusion is to assess its physical effects.10 A cyber operation is a use of force, the US 
government maintains, if its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber uses of force. 
Specific criteria are used to determine whether the use of force threshold is breached by 
a cyber operation: the context of the event, the actor perpetrating the action, the target 
and location, effects and intent.11 Such an effects-based analysis of cyber attacks considers 
serious death, injury, damage or destruction as the threshold for an armed attack. US 
government policy further states that any cyber use of force can be deemed an armed 
attack, triggering the self-defence provisions of LOAC.12
The central ambiguity of the LOAC rests on the distinction between the use of force and 
armed conflict. Contesting interpretations of the two categories makes the question of 
a breach of jus ad bellum difficult enough outside of a cyber context: all armed attacks 
constitute use of force, but not all uses of force are armed attacks.13 Whether an incident 
breaches the armed attack threshold determines whether force can legally be applied in 
self-defence. This gap in the LOAC’s response structure has existed long before cyberspace 
came about, but cyber conflict exacerbates the issue: it adds to the interpretative complexity 
of LOAC, and widens the zone of ambiguity surrounding the rules.14 Ultimately, the 
question of whether a cyber operation amounts to a use of a force and whether the armed 
attack threshold has been breached ‘depends on a holistic assessment of the incident 
in light of attendant circumstances’.15 In the absence of an internationally negotiated 
and sanctioned code of what is militarily permissible in cyberspace, such ad hoc legal 
assessments provide a fragile basis for international law to constrain the militarisation 
of cyberspace.16 
It is easy to conceive of cyber operations that bring about enormous disruption to an 
economy or lead to data theft on such a scale as to endanger national security. Take the 
following two scenarios:17 
(i) A state bombs the stock exchange building of another state at night.  
There are no casualties. A physical back-up and business continuity plan are in 
place. Trading is not disrupted. 
10 For a discussion of just how such assessments are made, see Schmitt, Michael N. (Ed.). Talinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyberspace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013
11 See Schmitt, Michael N. ‘International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed.’ 
Harvard International Law Journal (2012) Vol. 54
12 Koh, International Law in Cyberspace; see also Sofaer, Abraham D. ‘International Law and the Use of Force.’ 
American Society Of International Law Proceedings (1988) Vol. 420
13 See Schmitt, ‘International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed’
14 Fidler, David P. ‘Economic Cyber Espionage and International Law.’ American Society of International Law 
Insights, (2013) Vol. 17, p. 27
15 Schmitt, ‘International Law in Cyberspace’ p. 20
16 Ibid, p. 27
17 Based on Lin, Herbert S. ‘Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force.’ Journal Of National Security Law 
& Policy (2010) Vol. 4
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(ii)  A state launches a cyber attack against the stock exchange of another 
state at night. There are no casualties. The back-up is also compromised 
electronically and the business continuity plan fails. Trading is disrupted for 
a week.
These scenarios, designed to tease out the complexities of warfare in cyberspace, sit 
uneasily with the international laws of war. The first attack, owing to the physical 
destruction of a building, constitutes a use of force; the second attack brings about far 
greater economic damage, but, lacking a kinetic element, does not amount to a use of 
force. Therein lies the rub: the legal definitions of war do not reflect the full reality of 
combat in the cyber era.
The issue is not that international law is inapplicable to cyberspace: it is rather the 
unique nature of cyber activities, which can bring about destructive results without 
concomitant physical injury or damage.18 As Agent.Btz showed, cyberspace enables the 
scaling up of purely informational operations to the degree where states may feel their 
national security is under threat, even in the absence of a conventionally understood 
attack that produces immediate physical damage. Cyber hostilities are obscure: they 
occur electronically, involving lines of code as weapons; they need not (but can) create 
proximate kinetic effects, need not (but can) be launched remotely without any physical 
violation of the target state’s sovereignty and need not (but can) result in enormous loss 
of data and/or critical command and communications infrastructure. 
Considerable legal opacity surrounds such an obscure operational environment. Unless 
the laws of war are updated to accommodate new cyber realities, this state of affairs 
invites calamity. A continuing definitional vacuum creates a destabilising interpretative 
uncertainty and sets up an ‘offensive incentive’: it encourages offensive operations that 
endeavour to undershoot the ‘use of force’ threshold. Since this threshold is ultimately 
in the eye of the beholder, it is a matter of time before one state’s cyber espionage is 
another state’s cyber attack. If the line between spying and attacking in cyberspace has 
to be clarified retrospectively, it may be too late: the law needs to be one step ahead, 
not behind. 
18 Schmitt, p. 37 
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The key Task for sTaTes is To formally disTinguish BeTween cyBer 
exploiTaTion and cyBer aTTack, and To ouTlaw The laTTer
There are two main conceptual categories of cyber operation.19 The first is cyber 
exploitation, which is a non-destructive action, typically clandestine, that seeks to obtain 
information that would otherwise remain confidential. The second is cyber attack, which 
is a deliberately destructive action that aims to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy 
adversary computer systems or networks or the information resident in these systems 
or networks, whether clandestinely or not. In cyberspace, exploitation is a pure data 
acquisition mission, while an attack seeks to destabilise the adversary’s computer systems 
and networks, causing it to be unavailable or untrustworthy and therefore less useful to 
the adversary.20 
Espionage in a cyber context is a vexing issue. All states engage in the clandestine 
acquisition of confidential intelligence from other actors. The digital age has neither 
created nor changed this goal. What has changed, however, is the means available to 
states by which to achieve it. Whereas traditional espionage necessitated some kind 
of direct physical interaction with the target state, cyber espionage can be conducted 
without the perpetrator ever leaving their home state. This renders such intelligence 
work immune to the method used to tackle traditional espionage, namely, through 
target states’ domestic legal systems. Moreover, it has given spies the ability to scale up 
the rate and volume of data theft in a way that was hitherto unimaginable. In 2010, 
the director of the NSA called the loss of information and intellectual property through 
cyber espionage ‘the greatest transfer of wealth in history’, suggesting that states are 
beginning to see their core national security concerns affected by this dynamic. The line 
between espionage and covert operations is blurry in cyberspace, which is one of the 
reasons that it needs to be firmly drawn. States have historically been reluctant to treat 
espionage as anything other than a domestic law enforcement concern.21 This is because 
it is a useful practice employed by all states.22 In fact, insofar as it reduces information 
asymmetries between states, espionage can have a calming effect on international relations. 
19 The following definitions are based on Lin, ‘Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force’. See also Lin, 
‘Operational Considerations in Cyber Attack and Cyber Exploitation’ in Reveron (ed.), Derek (ed.), From 
Cybersecurity to Cyberwar
20 In technical terms, what distinguishes the two is the payload of the attack: an exploit accesses data, an attack 
affects functionality. A cyber exploiter seeks to compromise the confidentiality of protected information 
afforded by a computer system or network; an attacker seeks to degrade the system’s integrity. For a 
taxonomy of various cyber attacks and exploitations see Lin, ‘Operational Considerations’ 
21 The fact that states have been unwilling to outlaw or even codify espionage is evidence for the relevance of 
international law: states only sign such treaties when they actually intend to adhere to them. For that reason, 
Israel is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and Syria only joined the UN Chemical Weapons 
Convention in October 2013. 
22 Knake, Robert K. ‘Untangling Attribution: Moving to Accountability in Cyberspace.’ Prepared statement to the 
US House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology. Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack. 
July 5 2010. Accessed at < http://www.cfr.org/united-states/untangling-attribution-moving-accountability-
cyberspace/p22630> See also Lin, ‘Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force,’ 78; Scott, Roger D. 
‘Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law.’ Air Force Law Review (1999) Vol. 46, p. 
217
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Clarifying the meaning of armed attack and use of force in cyberspace has the added 
benefit of implicitly charting out the legitimate scope of other, national security-related 
clandestine cyber activity.
It is not immediately clear what the implications of cyber espionage are for the LOAC. 
Cyber espionage is not inhibited by the costs, consequences and limitations of traditional 
espionage.23 At the same time, espionage is not typically considered a hostile act. 
Opinions differ as to what the best strategy is to cope with digital espionage. Entities 
like the CIA argue that cyber espionage does not fall under the umbrella of cyber 
war, since the US government, like all governments, conducts network surveillance 
and has done so since the advent of electronic communications. One solution is to 
develop norms that accept the necessity of espionage, but recognise the potential for 
boundless digital espionage to do severe damage to trust between states, and limit the 
extent to which states engage in it.24 Another is to distinguish strictly between cyber 
operations that capture data, and those that alter the intruded network in a way that 
affects their functionality now or in the future.25 A further option is to tackle industrial 
espionage by expanding the provisions of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Currently, member states are obliged to protect 
certain intellectual property rights and trade secrets within their territories, but not in 
their operations abroad.26 
In 2009 the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia and China had breached the 
US electric grid and introduced malware with the potential to disable it, and that US 
intelligence agencies had detected successful cyber attacks against other states’ critical 
infrastructures.27 It is unclear whether the article is accurate or not, and it is also not 
reported whether the US has undertaken similar such operations. But in any case, 
even if it is not immediately destructive, the pre-emptive penetration of an adversary’s 
critical infrastructure is dangerous, destabilising and undermines trust between states. 
This situation – where cyberspace is used to launch attacks against other states’ civilian 
infrastructure, including the introduction of cyber vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure 
by stealth – is an example of the kind of cyber operation that sits uneasily with existing 
concepts and needs to be clearly defined as an illegal act of aggression.
It is for states to negotiate the specifics of any supplementary international laws of 
war that pertain to cyberspace. The overriding aim must be to address the definitional 
deficiencies of existing LOAC addressed above. The zone of ambiguity as regards cyber 
exploitation vs. attack vs. espionage, and use of force vs. armed attack, must be shrunk 
as much as possible. 
23 See Knake, ‘Untangling Attribution,’ p. 6
24 Ibid
25 See Oona Hathaway et al. ‘The Law of Cyber-Attack.’ California Law Review (2012) Vol. 817
26 See Fidler, p. 30
27 Gorman, Siobhan. ‘Electricity Grid in the US Penetrated by Spies.’ The Wall Street Journal. April 8, 2009. 
Web. Accessed 22 March 2014 
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new miliTary Technologies TesT The sTrengTh of exisTing laws 
 
Nuclear weapons were never formally outlawed under international law. What kept the 
peace between the US and the USSR was a volatile mixture of deterrence and an arms 
race. This worked because any nuclear attack could easily be traced to the aggressor 
and would be followed by symmetric retaliation; hence the apocalyptic name of this 
doctrine, Mutually Assured Destruction. Moreover, only a small number of states ever 
developed nuclear weapons, in part due to the technological challenges involved therein, 
but mostly because early mover states set about institutionalising a formal regime of 
non-proliferation to prevent the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons. This is not a 
possibility for cyber weapons.
Under current policy, cyber warfare is treated as subject to existing international law, like 
other new technologies that preceded it, such as nuclear weapons. But, as discussed, the 
military utility of the digital revolution is different: operations in cyberspace are diffuse, 
difficult to attribute, exhibit low barriers to entry, and are impossible to deter without 
explicit procedural frameworks (i.e. international law) that govern responses to such 
attacks. Where nuclear technology brought about deterrence, cyber operations incentivise 
offence, at least in the absence of a clear and credible definition of what amounts to the 
use of force in cyberspace.28 This report therefore makes the case that explicit protocols 
of international law in cyberspace ought to be developed and enshrined in treaty law, in 
order to update definitions and concepts of aggression and war that made sense in the 
pre-digital world, but are dangerously ambiguous and vague in a digital context. 
We have already witnessed military operations in cyberspace that has been deemed 
offensive by some states and acts of nuisance by others. A widely cited cyber operation 
against Estonia in 2008 crippled the country’s telecommunications infrastructure, creating 
serious and widespread disruption of the country’s financial and communication systems. 
It was initially characterised by Estonian officials as an armed attack, giving the country the 
right to military self-defence. NATO allies, faced with the possibility of being dragged into 
a military conflict, interpreted the attack differently. It is difficult to slot cyber operations 
into LOAC’s legal categories, a task that would be greatly aided if internationally agreed-
upon definitions were drafted. Clearly, international lawyers would not be facing similar 
issues in the event of a nuclear attack. 29 
In the absence of a consensus on what counts as illegal offense and legitimate 
defence in the cyber domain, states will be tempted to push the boundaries of the 
acceptable. Former NSA and CIA Director Michael Hayden was blunt about this dynamic: 
28 See Andres, Richard B. Andres, ‘Strategic Cyber Offense, Cyber Defense, and Cyber Deterrence’ in Reveron 
(ed.) Cyberspace and National Security
29 See Fidler, David P. ‘Inter arma silent leges Redux? The Law of Armed Conflict and Cyber Conflict’ in Reveron 
(ed.) Cyberspace and National Security
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‘We are moving from a world in which most cyber problems are 
mainly about stealing your data to a world in which cyber is being 
used to deliberately create direct kinetic consequences: effects on your 
information, effects on your networks, and other adverse physical effects 
on assets that are valuable to you. As surely as night follows day, these 
cyber security risks are going to expand over time.’30 
In short, we can expect cyber operations to proliferate – a trend that has already 
begun31 – until the day a targeted state decides that LOAC has been breached and 
responds accordingly. If clear legal constraints on cyber operations are set up now, this 
potentially disastrous scenario can be averted.
 
The operaTional successes achieved in cyBerspace are impressive, 
BuT should noT Blind us To Their consideraBle dangers
Some spectacular operations have taken place in cyberspace. Stuxnet, for example, 
was a successful cyber attack that set back Iran’s nuclear programme by multiple 
years.32 Is it really sensible to deprive our militaries of what appears to be an effective 
delivery channel for operations that do not entail full-scale warfare? Focusing only on 
the operational success of cyber missions neglects the wider strategic picture. Stuxnet 
achieved no more than a temporary delay in Iran’s nuclear programme. At the same 
time, it implicitly legitimised this kind of cyber sabotage. So it was in a sense only a 
matter of time before a retaliatory mission would succeed. This eventually occurred in 
the form of a cyber attack on Saudi Aramco’s internal computer network, rendering 
30,000 computers inoperable.33 While oil production remained unaffected, this episode 
was a worrying taste of the kind of tit-for-tat, gradual escalation of tensions in cyber 
that needs to be avoided. If this dynamic continues unchecked, cyberspace will become 
increasingly militarised. And it mustn’t be forgotten that cyberspace is a shared military 
and civilian arena. The civilian portion depends on a large degree of trust and confidence 
in the integrity of the network for it to function properly. It is in all of our interests to 
prevent cyberspace from turning into a battlefield in all but name. This does not equate 
to outlawing all offensive uses of cyberweapons – it means clarifying what can and 
cannot be done military in cyberspace, thus ending the current free-for-all.
30 Joye, Christopher. ‘Transcript: Interview with former CIA, NSA Chief Michael Hayden.’ Australian Financial 
Review. 19 July 2013. Web. Accessed 22 March 2014
31 Watts, Sean. ‘Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense.’ In Pedrozo, Raul A. and 
Wollschlaeger, Daria P. (eds.). International Law and the Changing Character of War. International Law 
Studies Vol. 87, 2011
32 Arimatsu, Louise and Mary Ellen O’Connell. ‘Cyber Security and International Law.’ Chatham House 
International Law Meeting Summary. 29 May 2012
33 See Bronk, Christopher and Tikk-Ringas, Eneken. ‘The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco.’ Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy (2013) Vol. 55
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if sTaTes agree To assisT each oTher in cyBer law enforcemenT as a 
maTTer of rouTine, cyBer aTTacks By proxy acTors are unlikely and 
cyBer crime can Be pursued more vigorously 
Even if such international law does come about, states can still engage in prohibited acts, 
because it is nearly impossible to prove culpability in cyberspace. It is a legitimate worry 
that the difficulties in attributing cyber operations make the enforcement of international 
law more challenging. Contrary to popular belief, however, attribution is not so much 
a technical issue as one of lack of international cooperation.34 Security professionals are 
almost always able to build a fairly comprehensive investigative case after an attack, 
through a mixture of technical forensics and traditional intelligence work.35 In this day and 
age, such investigations can even be undertaken by non-governmental entities. 
 
Last year, the security company Mandiant published an exhaustive report on China’s 
main army unit conducting operations in cyberspace, down to identifying the very 
building that houses the unit in question and even some of its individual operatives (who 
were identified because they had used their computing skills to circumvent China’s 
Facebook ban).36 
Even the most mysterious of cyber incidents carry traces of authorship. The main obstacle 
to successful attribution is that states don’t cooperate with each other’s inquiries 
as a matter of routine. If an organisation is set up by treaty to facilitate cross-border 
law enforcement in cyberspace – an Internetpol, so to speak – and signatories accept 
a positive duty to assist other signatories’ law enforcement inquiries for specified 
crimes, the incentive for states to conduct offensive cyber operations at arm’s length 
through proxy actors is reduced. Following the aforementioned cyber incursion against 
Estonia, for example, the investigating agencies were able to trace the origin of the 
attack to Russia. The Russian government, however, simply refused to co-operate with 
the investigation, and no effort was made to track down the culprits.37 Attribution by 
non-cooperation ought to therefore be included in the body of international cyber 
law that this report suggests should be drafted. If uncooperative states are assumed 
to share culpability in an attack that can clearly be traced to their borders, states will 
have a strong incentive not to engage in such behaviour. Lower standards of attribution 
make sense in cyberspace by putting states on the line and encouraging them to rein in 
unauthorised operations by cyber militias.38
34 Knake, ‘Untangling Attribution’, p.5
35 So it was, for instance, with the Agent.btz attack. See Stewart, Phil and Wolf, Jim. ‘Old Worm Won’t Die 
After 2008 Attack on Military.’ Reuters. 17 June 2011. Published online. Accessed 22 March 2014 at <http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/17/us-usa-cybersecurity-worm-idUSTRE75F5TB20110617>
36 Mandiant. APT1 -  Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Unit. 18 February 2013. Published online. 
Accessed 22 March at < http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf>
37 Shackleford, Scott J. ‘From Nuclear War to Netwar.’ Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009) Vol. 27, p. 
208  
38 International law is malleable in this regard. The International Court of Justice opted for a high standard for 
attribution in Nicaragua v. United States (complete dependence of the operation on a nation state) while 
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The result of all this will be a degree of regulation in military cyberspace, which then 
allows states to devote more energy to a task that concerns them all equally: cyber 
crime. Far too little effort is spent prosecuting cyber criminals, who cleverly take 
advantage of the barriers of sovereignty. Conducting operations in other jurisdictions, 
they are currently safe in the knowledge that cross-border prosecution is such a 
complex endeavour that it is unlikely they will ever face justice.39 The global cost of 
cyber criminality may be as high as $1 trillion per year.40 
50 states have so far signed the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, also 
known as the Budapest Convention. This is the only binding international instrument 
that seeks to tackle Internet criminality. Its signatories include all of the members of 
the Council of Europe bar Russia, as well as the US, Japan and Australia. The Budapest 
Convention synchronises national laws on cyber criminality, which facilitates cross-
border cooperation. It has done much to improve the prosecution of borderless cyber 
crimes, especially through provisions such as a 24/7 points of contact network between 
parties to expedite assistance requests; the requirement to preserve evidence at the 
request of another party which can then follow up with a request to search, seize, 
or disclose that data; and the positive duties on parties to harmonise investigative 
procedures and legal frameworks of cyber crime. Most categories of cyber crimes are 
covered by the Convention.41 
However, parties can refuse cooperation if they deem that providing assistance would 
prejudice their sovereignty, public order or other ‘essential interests’. Moreover, 
there is no enforcement mechanism to oblige states to fulfil their cooperative duties. 
Straightforward improvements of the Convention would include circumscribing the 
grounds for refusing assistance to other parties, and reforming the Convention’s current 
dispute resolution mechanism to provide for mandatory reviews by a neutral arbiter 
whenever a party whose assistance request has been denied asks for one.42 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established a lower attribution threshold 
in Prosecutor v. Tadic (overall control of the operation by a nation state). See Fidler, ‘Inter arma silent 
leges Redux’; International Court of Justice, ‘Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,’ ICJ Reports (1986); International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1999) Case No. IT-94–1-A
39 See, for instance, Bhattacharjee, Yudhijit. “How a Remote Town in Romania Has Become Cybercrime 
Central.” Wired Magazine. 31 Jan. 2011. Web. 22 Mar. 2014.
40 Myrli, Sevrre. ‘NATO and Cyber Defence.’ NATO Parliamentary Assembly Commmittee Reports 2009. 173 
DSCFC 09 E BIS. Web. Accessed 22 March at <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1782> It 
is difficult to obtain such statistics, because companies are likely to under-report these kinds of incidents 
– after all, prosecution is unlikely while reputational costs are high. The benefits of to systematically 
going after cyber criminals are enormous: as anyone participating in e-commerce can attest, the 
pervasive threat of crime adds substantial layers of cost and complexity to doing business on the Internet. 
See, for instance, Binham, Caroline. ‘The Hacker Hunters.’ Financial Times Magazine. 21 November 2013.
41 The full text of the Convention is available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.
htm>
42 National Research Council. Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks: Informing Strategies 
and Developing Options for U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010
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inTernaTional cooperaTion over The prosecuTion of cyBer 
criminals faciliTaTes TrusT BeTween sTaTes, makes The inTerneT 
more secure, and creaTes The Basis for a meaningful legal 
framework for sTaTe conducT in cyBerspace 
Countries such as Russia and China, suspected of orchestrating state-sponsored or 
state-tolerated cyber incursions, are not party to the Convention. Russia, however, has 
on multiple occasions called for an international cyber arms control treaty. Specifically, 
it has called for the prohibition of inserting malicious code in another country’s 
computers for use in the event of war, the prohibition of attacks on noncombatant 
networks and other restrictions on the military use of cyber weapons.43 In 2010, NSA 
Director Keith Alexander responded to Russian prompts on the matter, agreeing on the 
need to ‘establish the rules [for cyber warfare] and I think what Russia’s put forward is, 
perhaps, the starting point for international debate’.44 
The overall aim is to move the international community of states into a position where 
cyber-related cross-border cooperation of law enforcement is a matter of routine, 
regulated by treaty. An accord on cyber war is needed to clarify the definitions 
of LOAC in cyberspace, helping to bring clarity into what is currently an under-
regulated domain of warfare. By creating a degree of certainty as regards permissible 
state behaviour in cyberspace, governments can step away from the risky game of 
maximising cyber operations without breaching the armed attack threshold, and focus 
on the scourge of cyber criminality, which is undermining confidence in the Internet 
as a whole. An institutionalised basis for international cooperation on cyber crime 
would make life harder for cyber criminals. As an added benefit, a treaty on cyber 
crime would lessen the attribution dilemma, since non-cooperation by a state can 
then be seen an indication of a degree of state responsibility for a cyber incident.45 
In practical terms, it is up to states to initiate the treaty process. The Budapest 
Convention provides a solid basis for combating cyber crime; it could be amended 
as per the points above and an effort launched to bring on board more signatories. 
The UN Disarmament & International Security Committee appears to be the most 
appropriate forum for talks to commence on a cyber war treaty. The incentive 
structure for states to engage in such a process is easily framed in the game theory 
terms that are familiar to students of bargaining and cooperation under anarchy.46 
The simplest explanatory analogy is the Prisoner’s Dilemma: it is in the interest of all 
43 See Kramer, Andrew E. and Markoff, John. ‘U.S. and Russia Differ on a Treaty for Cyberspace.’ The New 
York Times. 27 June 2009. Web. 22 March 2014
44 Transcript of Remarks by Gen. K. Alexander at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C. (June 3, 2010) at 11, available at <http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches_
testimonies/100603_alexander_transcript.pdf>
45 National Research Council. Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyberattacks
46 The seminal work here is Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert. ‘Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy 
– Strategies and Institutions.’ World Politics (1985) Vol. 38
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states if cyberspace becomes a more ordered military domain, by anchoring expectations 
and introducing a degree of certainty for governments. It is in the private interest of each 
state to defect from this regime and secure the benefits of unrestrained cyber warfare 
on its own. To avoid all states from following their private interest and defecting, it is 
necessary to monitor compliance, ideally through an institution charged with this task 
(which generates what Axelrod and Keohane call the ‘shadow of the future’). Curiously, 
although international law has no formal enforcement mechanism, states’ adherence 
to it, as has been noted, is widespread and consistent. The reasons are likely to be a 
mixture of enlightened self-interest in an ordered international community, legitimacy 
(both of international law and of the compliant state in the eyes of its population as 
well as the international community) and the norms of socialisation that have built up 
over the past century as international law grew in depth and breadth.47 
The main hurdle facing this scheme is that states fear giving up a military advantage – 
a fear that is nullified if all states sign up to the treaty – and the worry that regulating a 
decentralised, non-hierarchical network like cyberspace is antithetical to its fundamental 
purpose. Specifically, concerns have been voiced that regulating cyberspace will 
generate momentum for those states that seek to exert censorship and state control 
over the Internet.48 The idea that information is free, with the Internet as the medium 
to decentralise the global flow of knowledge and empower citizens across the globe, is 
indeed appealing to those who believe in freedom of speech as a fundamental force for 
good in the world. At the same time, it is easy to romanticise this point. Whether or not 
citizens enjoy a ‘free web’ still depends first and foremost on the domestic legal situation 
in which they find themselves. A state intent on censoring the Internet can do so easily, 
with or without a treaty on cyber war. What advocates for an open Internet seem to miss 
is that a key ingredient of the web is trust between the disparate nodes and actors in the 
network. A gradual militarisation of cyberspace will hamper cyberspace’s effectiveness 
as a tool for commercial and social exchange. Moreover, the arms race dynamic that can 
develop absent a treaty on cyber war is a boon to cybercriminals, who, if left unchecked, 
will make e-commerce an increasingly slow, costly and cumbersome affair. That is in 
nobody’s interest.
47 Koh concludes his famous review article, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’, with the following 
passage: “‘Why is it,’ Oran Young asked in 1992, ‘that an actor acquires and feels some sense of 
obligation to conform its behavior to the dictates or requirements of a regime or an institution? ... I think 
that there are differences in being obligated to do something because of a moral reason, a normative 
reason and a legal reason.’ Although Young did not further specify, I would argue that these moral, 
normative, and legal reasons are in fact conjoined in the concept of obedience. A transnational actor’s 
moral obligation to obey an international norm becomes an internally binding domestic legal obligation 
when that norm has been interpreted and internalized into its domestic legal system. Both Franck 
and the Chayeses, exemplars of the philosophical and process traditions, respectively, recognize that 
transnational actors are more likely to comply with international law when they accept its legitimacy 
through some internal process.” 
48 For an overview of the debate, see Gross, Michael Joseph. ‘World War 3.0’ Vanity Fair (May 2012). Web. 
Accessed 22 March 2014
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conclusion
Technology and war have always coexisted in an uneasy juxtaposition, each feeding off 
the other, creating the basis for both humanity’s progress and for awful, bloody setbacks. 
A century after the outbreak of World War I, it is worth remembering that one of the 
reasons why the war assumed such monstrous dimensions was that strategists had been 
blithe about the impact of technological progress. Machine guns, tanks, gas, aeroplanes 
and modern warships unleashed a degree of carnage that was simply not anticipated 
in advance by war planners.49 The danger we face today is that digital technology is not 
tamed through social norms, and the world sleepwalks into a future where aggressive 
state behaviour in cyberspace causes increasing damage and ill-will among nations. 
Military strategists have been busy adapting their force structures to the cyber era, but the 
evolution of war’s legal standards lags behind.
Humanity has a tendency to learn lessons post hoc, but good policy-making is as much 
about proactively mitigating against bad consequences before it is too late. Because 
success here is measured by the absence, not presence, of an event, such policy is harder 
to sell. This report aims to achieve such a ‘sell’ by highlighting the inadequacies of existing 
LOAC in cyberspace, and suggesting potential principles for a future body of international 
law concerning conflict in cyberspace. 
Any zone of ambiguity in the law, history and logic teach us, will be exploited by states 
operating in an insecure environment. Currently, this zone of ambiguity in cyberspace is 
large, but it can be narrowed. That is the task that statesmen face. 
Cyberspace is functionally distinct from all other military domains (air, sea, land and 
space). It isn’t just a physical but also an informational realm. And because of the close 
proximity of kinetic operations (resulting in physical damage of the kind that LOAC was 
designed to regulate) and espionage operations in cyberspace, the lines between armed 
attack, the use of force and intelligence operations are blurring. We need a specific set 
of definitions that clarifies cyber hostilities. Currently there is no internationally agreed 
upon set of standards regarding what counts as an armed attack in cyberspace. This 
increases the likelihood of misunderstandings that can unintentionally lead to conflict. 
It also incentivises offensive tactics in cyberspace, as states push the boundaries of the 
acceptable in order to test other states’ commitment to defend their national security, and 
their strategies for doing so.  
49 See, for instance, Macmillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace: How Europe Abandoned Peace for the 
First World War. London: Profile Books, 2013. P. 5
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In an era in which the meaning of armed attack is diluted by the presence of a new 
operational domain with novel properties, it is imperative that clear constraints on state 
behaviour are established. The worry that states will end up conducting cyber-attacks at 
arm’s length through proxies, allowing them to disavow responsibility later, is legitimate. 
By creating a legal responsibility to assist law enforcement enquiries by victim nations, 
such states will be forced to show their hands one way or another. 
By design, the Internet relies on a firm bedrock of trust for its optimal operation. Common 
protocols, mutual identification and the security of encrypted data transmission are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for commerce and other exchanges to take place 
on a disparate network like the Internet lacking a ‘Leviathan’, or central overseer. If 
insecurity and aggression become defining features of the Internet, it will lose most 
of its potential as a force for good in the world. By contrast, if cyberspace no longer 
presents an arena of warfare with unclear rules, and militaries can approach this domain 
with a degree of regulatory certainty, then states can focus their energies on pursuing 
cyber criminals. The world will be better off for it. ■  
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The laws of war and cyBerspace 
on The need for 
a TreaTy concerning 
cyBer conflicT
This report examines the militarization of cyberspace 
and considers ways to prevent the Internet from turning 
into a battlefield. Cyberspace is a domain of warfare 
unlike all others: it is primarily informational in nature, 
accessible electronically without the need for spatial 
proximity, and acts as a global data and communication 
highway. These properties have given rise to highly 
unusual patterns of continuous, low-intensity 
clandestine cyber conflict. The existing Laws of War, 
which apply to cyberspace as a matter of doctrine,  
are ill-equipped to deal with this. The community 
of states must negotiate a treaty on cyberwar, 
institutionalise cross-border law enforcement 
cooperation of cybercriminals, and place state-
sponsored digital espionage within the World Trade 
Organisation’s remit to arbitrate anti-competition 
disputes. Absent these steps, the Internet will become 
increasingly militarised, international cybercrime will 
continue to elude serious prosecution efforts, and the 
web’s utility for commercial and civilian purposes will 
degrade over time. 
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